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Abstract
Is it always the case that an environmental friendly CSR rm will be preferred to a consumer caring
CSR-rm in terms of the environmental damage generated in the market?. Will always an environmental
friendly CSR rm be preferred to a rm which concerns only with prot maximization?. We explore these
questions by analizyng a duopoly market setting in which a CSR rm interacts with a prot maximizing
rm. Unlike previous literature, we consider di¤erent motivations for the CSR rm: (i) the CSR rm
acts as a consumer-friendly rm, cares for not only its prots but also consumer surplus, as a proxy of
its concern for its "stakeholders" or consumers; (ii) the CSR rm main objective is a combination of its
own prot and the environment, caring for the environmental damage produced by the market in which
it interacts; and (iii) the CSR rm is both consumer and environmental friendly. As benchmark we also
consider the case in which both rms in the duopoly only concern about material prots, evaluating for
all cases the environmental damage generated in their market interaction.
Keywords : Corporate social responsibility, consumer-friendly rm, environment-friendly rm, Mixed
Duopoly, Emission Taxation
JEL Classication : L13, L31, H23, Q50,
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1 Introduction
There is a current trend in business strategy by which rms are gradually, and increasingly, adopting cor-
porate practices that go beyond prot-maximizing objectives, taking also into account ethical regards, com-
munity welfare and environmental sustainability as important business habits.1Consequently, the economic
literature has started modelling oligopoly markets in which some private rms, that we call here CSR rms,
di¤erentiate from others by maximizing its prot as well as a fraction of the market consumer surplus, in
order to reect its consumer-friendly spirit. Among the topics addressed by this literature we can men-
tion: vertical supply chains (Goering, 2014 and Brand and Grothe, 2015); horizontal products di¤erentiation
(Matsumura and Ogawa, 2014 and Kopel and Brand, 2012) and strategic tari¤ policy (Wang et al. 2012,
and Liu et al. 2018). There are few works analyzing the environmental problem in this context.2
Nevertheless, one theoretical question that can be put forward is what motivations of CSR rms are more
benign towards the environment. For example, is it always the case that an environmental friendly CSR
rm will be preferred to a consumer caring CSR-rm in terms of the environmental damage generated in the
market?. Similarly, will always an environmental friendly CSR rm be preferred to a rm which concerns only
with prot maximization?. While the answers to these questions appear obvious we formally show that this
is not always the case. Hence, the main aim of this work is to formally study di¤erent potential motivations
for a CSR rm and its potential impact on the environment. Particularly, we explore a duopoly market
setting in which a CSR rm interacts with a prot maximizing rm. Unlike previous literature, we consider
three di¤erent scenarios: (i) the CSR rm acts as a consumer-friendly rm, cares for not only its prots
but also consumer surplus, as a proxy of its concern for its "stakeholders" or consumers; (ii) the CSR rm
main objective is a combination of its own prot and the environment, caring for the environmental damage
produced by the market in which it interacts, and (iii) the CSR rm is both consumer and environmental
friendly, caring about its prot, a share of consumer surplus and environmental damage. Previous literature
typically uses the denition of a CSR rm given by case (i), assuming that it maximizes prots plus a
fraction of consumer surplus (see Kopel and Brand, 2012 and Goering, 2014). Adding these additional cases
will allow us to evaluate more recent trends in the CSR literature in which environmental concerns have
also become a priority for stakeholders and consumers (see, inter alia, Barman, 2018). As benchmark we
also consider the case in which both rms in the duopoly, the CSR rm and the other private rm, only
concern about material prots, evaluating for all cases the environmental damage generated in their market
interactions.
1See for instance: https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/campaigns/csr/pdf/CSR_Reporting_2017.pdf.
2The exception is provided by the recent works of Liu, et al. (2015), Leal et al (2018), García et al (2018) and Xu and Lee
(2018).
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2 The Model
Consider a single industry made up of two polluters: one CSR rm labeled 0 and a private rm labeled
1, which competes in quantities with homogeneous products (or perfect substitutes). Both rms have pro-
duction levels of a single product output q0 and q1, with total output given by Q = q0 + q1 and an inverse
demand function f(Q) = a   Q = a   (q0 + q1), where a > 0 is the market size, and f
0(Q) < 0. . Both
rms discharge pollution into the environment, which we denote by d0 and d1, generating D(d0+d1) in total
external environmental damages. Let total resource costs for the pollution-generating rm be represented
by: c0(q0; w0) =
q2
0
+w2
0
2 and c1(q1; w1) =
q2
1
+w2
1
2 , where w0 and w1 represent resources devoted to pollution
treatment. Assume that the rm has two ways of reducing its emissions levels d0 and d1. It may either
reduce output, q0 and q1, or it may devote more resources w0 and w1 to the treatment of pollution once
it is produced, which we model as: d0(q0; w0) =
q0 w0
2 and d1(q1; w1) =
q1 w1
2 . We also consider a tax on
emissions, t, which works as a tax rate per unit of pollution discharged. Both rms prot functions are then
given by:
i(qi; wi) = f(Q)qi   c(qi; wi)  d(qi; wi)t for i = 0; 1 (1)
As customary in the literature, we assume that the CSR rm, contrary to prot-maximizing private rms,
cares for not only its prots but also for a fraction of the consumer surplus, CS, as a proxy of the rms
concern on consumers. We also consider the case in which a the CSR rm also cares for the environmental
damage produced by the duopoly, D, as a proxy of the rms concern for the environment. Hence the
objective of the CSR-rm is a combination of consumers surplus, environmental damage and its own prot:
v0 = 0 + CS   D (2)
Let the parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the fraction or percentage of total market consumer surplus that is
of concern or accrues to the socially concerned rms stakeholders. When  = 1, all consumers welfare is of
interest to this rm while, conversely, when  = 0 the rm is not consumer friendly in our model. Similarly,
the parameter  2 [0; 1] measures the degree of concern on environmental damage by the CSR rm. When
 = 1, all environmental damage is of interest to the CSR rm while, conversely, when  = 0 the rm is not
environment friendly in our setting. We assume that  and  are exogenously given. This denition of CSR
implies the CSR rm is willing to accept less prots to act in a more socially and environmentally concerned
way. In other words, in our setting CSR is purely a costly activity (see, for instance, Goering, 2014).
We dene social welfare as the di¤erence between the sum of producers and consumers surplus and any
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technological external costs which are not accounted for in producers surplus.3 Particularly, in this setting
we assume that social welfare will be given by the sum of consumer surplus, CS, the prots of both rms,
0 + 1, and tax revenue T = (d0t+ d1t), minus environmental damage, D(d0 + d1) (Leal et al. 2018)
4 :
SW = CS + f(Q)(q0 + q1)  c0   c1  D(d0 + d1) (3)
where CS =
R Q
0
(a Q) dz   (a Q)Q = Q
2
2 .
The payo¤ that the CSR rm maximizes is as follows:
v0(q0; w0) = f(Q)q0   c(q0; w0)  d(q0; w0)t+ 
 Z Q
0
f(z)dz   f(Q)(Q)
!
  D(d(q0; w0) + d(q1; w1)) (4)
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to pure strategies. Our modelling strategy is based on a
sequential two stage game. In the rst stage the regulator chooses the emissions tax (t) that maximizes
social welfare, which will be levied on the two rms. In the second stage the two rms choose their levels
of production (q) and pollution abatement (w). In this sequential game of perfect information, any stage is
a subgame and a strategy vector is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) only if it induces a Nash
equilibrium in the strategic form of every subgame. In this context, SPNE reduces to backward induction.
Denition 1 A strategy for the regulator is a tax amount t  0 and a strategy for the rms is i(qi; wi),
where i() is a mapping from the domain of t to the domain of (qi; wi). Assuming that the regulator is the
rst mover, an equilibrium of this duopoly game is then a pair (t; i (q

i ; w

i )) for i = 0; 1, such that:
i. SW (t; i (q

i ; w

i ))  SW (t; 

i (q

i ; w

i ));8t  0; i = 0; 1 ;
ii. 1(

1(q

1 ; w

1))  1(1(q1; w1));8q1  0; w1  0; and
iii. v0(

0(q

0 ; w

0))  v0(i(q0; w0));8q0  0; w0  0
In other words, an equilibrium in this game imposes that: (i) the strategy of the rms be a single-valued
selection from their best-response correspondences for qi and wi given a tax t; and (ii) the regulator chooses
a tax that maximizes the social welfare function given the optimal strategy of the rms (qi ; w

i )for i = 0; 1.
Thus, we start our analysis with stage two, in which the private and CSR rms must choose their
production (q0; q1) and abatement (w0; w1) levels, given a tax, t, dened by the regulator in stage 1. Thus,
3Here, a real income constant measure of consumers surplus, such as equivalent or compensating variation should be used
to be strictly correct. Nevertheless, the area under a money-income constant demand curve is a good estimate of a welfare
measure.
4Since we dene social welfare as. SW , CS + (f(Q)q0   c0   d0t) + (f(Q)q1   c1   d1t) + (d0t+ d1t) D(d0 + d1)
we can notice that taxes are merely income transfers from the rms to the government, and therefore, they are canceled out.
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the associated optimization problem faced by the private rm in this stage is given by:
max
q1;w1
1(q1; w1) = (a  (q0 + q1)) q1  

q21 + w
2
1
2

 

q1   w1
2

t (5)
Similarly, for the CSR rm the problem becomes:
max
q0;w0
v0(q0; w0) = (a  (q0 + q1)) q0  

q20 + w
2
0
2

 

q0   w0
2

t+
Q2
2
  

q0   w0
2
+
q1   w1
2

(6)
We denote the set of equilibria in this stage by S2 and its typical element by the strategy prole: S2 =
f(q0(t); w

0(t)); (q

1(t); w

1(t))g. Now with S2 the regulator in the rst stage chooses the tax rate per unit of
emissions discharged, t, that maximizes the social welfare function, see (3):
max
t
SW =

Q 
Q2
2

 

q20 + w
2
0
2

 

q21 + w
2
1
2

 

q0   w0
2
+
q1   w1
2

(7)
Likewise, S1 identies equilibria in this stage given by (t
).
3 Results
From solving the Nash Equilibrium of the second stage we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 Assuming that in the rst stage of the game, the CSR rm and the other private rm view t as
a parameter, we get the following rst-order conditions for the prot maximization of (6) and (5), which
implicitly dene the strategy prole S2 = f(q

0(t); w

0(t)); (q

1(t); w

1(t))g: (i) q

0(t) =
 (2a t) 4a+2t+3
4 16 ; (ii)
q1(t) =
(2a t) 4a+2t 
4 16 ; (iii) w

0(t) =
t+
2 ; (iv) w

1(t) =
t
2 .
Di¤erentiating the FOCs of the second stage, presented in Lemma 1, with respect to parameters t,  and
 (with  and  2 [0; 1]) we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 The comparative statics of S2 = f(q

0(t); w

0(t)); (q

1(t); w

1(t))g with respect to t,  and  is given
by: (i)
@q
0
@t
= +24( 4) < 0;
@q
0
@
= 34( 4) < 0;
@q
1
@t
=    24( 4) < 0;
@q
1
@
=   14( 4) > 0;
@w
0
@t
= 12 > 0;
@w
0
@
= 12 > 0;
@w
0
@
= 0;
@w
1
@t
= 12 > 0;
@w
1
@
= 0;
@w
1
@
= 0; (ii) Whenever 4a > 2t +  we obtain:
@q
0
@
=
3(4a 2t )
4( 4)2
> 0;
@q
1
@
=   4a 2t 
4( 4)2
< 0 (if 4a < 2t+  then the opposite holds true:
@q
0
@
< 0;
@q
1
@
> 0 )
From Lemma 2, it transpires that as expected an increase in the equilibrium welfare-maximizing tax
reduces the equilibrium level of production for both rms and increases the resources devoted to pollution
treatment. Moreover, an increase in the parameter that measures the degree of concern on environmental
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damage by the CSR rm, reduces the equilibrium level of production for the CSR rm and increases the
production of the private rm. It also increases the pollution abatement resources of the CSR rm, but not
those of the private rm. Finally, an increase in the parameter that represents the fraction of consumer
surplus that is of concern of the CSR rm has no e¤ect on the resources devoted to pollution treatment but
it does have an e¤ect on the level of production for both rms, which depend upon the size of the market,
the tax rate and the degree of concern on environmental damage by the CSR rm.
Let us now focus on the rst stage of the game, in which the regulator faces the problem pointed out in
(7). After di¤erentiating SW with respect to t and combining with the FOCs highlighted in Lemma 1, we
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium welfare-maximizing tax in the general setting becomes:
t =
(2a  2+ 4) 2 + (14  28)  + 24a  38+ 48
52   32 + 76
(8)
Similarly, environmental damage is now given by D = d0(q

0(t
); w0(t
))+d0(q

0(t
); w0(t
)). Therefore,
using Lemma 1 and (8) we can get the following result:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium environmental damage is given by:
D =  
2 (8 + + 4a) +  (16a  64  5)  16a+ 120
202   128 + 304
(9)
We can now characterize the equilibrium in order to show some of the main results of the model exploiting
some corner solutions.
Proposition 3 Given (9) and the di¤erent potential objectives of the CSR-rm, as a combination of con-
sumers surplus, environmental damage and its own prot, we obtain the optimal levels of environmental
damage for the following cases:
(i) Both rms in the duopoly have only a prot maximizing objective, not taking into account the consumers
nor the environment in their decisions, namely: v0 = 0 and 1( = 0 and  = 0) from which it
transpires that: D = 138 (2a  15)
(ii) The objective of the CSR-rm is a combination of consumers surplus, and its own prot, that is: v0 =
0 + CS ( > 0 and  = 0) from which it transpires that: D
 =   
2(a+2)+4(a 4) 4a+30
52 32+76
. As  > 0,
we have in this setting that if  = 1, that is, all consumers welfare is of interest to the CSR rm we
also obtain: D =   149 (a+ 16)
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(iii) The objective of the CSR-rm is to maximize its material prot minus the environmental damage
produced by the duopoly, that is: v0 = 0   D ( = 0 and  > 0) from which it transpires that: D
 =
2a 15
38 . As  > 0, we have in this setting that if  = 1, that is, all environmental damage is of interest
to the CSR rm we obtain: D = 138 (2a  15)
(iv) The objective of the CSR-rm is a combination of consumers surplus, environmental damage and
its own prot, where v0 = 0 + CS   D ( > 0 and  > 0) from which it transpires that:
D =   
2(8++4a)+(16a 5 64) 16a+120
202 128+304
. Considering the case in which  = 1 and  = 1, that
is, all consumers welfare and all environmental damage is of interest to the CSR rm we obtain:
D =  a+1549 =  
1
49 (a+ 15)
From Proposition 3, we can further infer the following result.
Corollary 1 In the context of our duopoly market setting in which a CSR rm interacts with a prot
maximizing rm, from the viewpoint of environmental damage, we nd that:
(i) The consumer friendly CSR-rm is preferred to the environmentally friendly CSR-rm.
(ii) The consumer friendly CSR-rm is preferred to the consumer-environment friendly CSR-rm .
(iii) The consumer-environment friendly CSR-rm is preferred to the environmentally friendly CSR-rm.
(iv) The environmentally friendly CSR-rm produces the same environmental damage than a CSR rm
would have obtained ascribing to a prot maximizing objective, that is not taking into account neither
consumers nor the environment in its decisions.
The main explanation behind this result is that the consumer friendly CSR-rm is the one that produces
a higher quantity of the product, much higher than the private rm, but at the same time it is in this setting
in which the tax rate is also the higher since the trade-o¤ between the environmental negative externality
and the welfare loss associated with the duopoly restricted output, necessarily requires that the optimal
second best tax rate must be very high in this setting. This is not the case with an environmentally friendly
CSR-rm, which produces a very low quantity of production, but the private rm produces more and the
tax rate is lower than in the case of the consumer friendly CSR-rm. The consumer-environment friendly
CSR-rm case is the closest to the one that provokes less damage to the environment. In this case the CSR
rm also produces a rather high product quantity, and so the private rm produces a lower quantity and the
tax rate in turn is also high. This analysis becomes clear inspecting Table 1, which shows a summary of the
individual and total equilibrium levels of production and taxes rates:
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Table 1: Equilibrium levels of Production
Prot Maximizing Consumer friendly Environmentally friendly Consumer-Environment friendly
( = 0 and  = 0) ( = 1 and  = 0) ( = 0 and  = 1) ( = 1 and  = 0)
t = 6a+1219 t
 = 26a+2449 t
 = 6a19 +
5
38 t
 = 26a 249
q0 =
4a
19  
3
38 q

0 =
18a 6
49 q

0 =
4a
19  
31
152 q

0 =
18a
49  
47
196
q1 =
4a
19  
3
38 q

1 =
6a 2
49 q

1 =
4a
19  
7
152 q

1 =
6a
49 +
17
196
Q = 8a 319 Q
 = 24a 849 Q
 = 8a 319 Q
 = 24a49  
15
98
4 Concluding Remarks
The results presented in this note are rather counter-intuitive. It is not the environmentally friendly CSR-
rm, that cares for all environmental damage, which produces lower environmental damage interacting with
a private, prot maximizing rm. In fact, this rm ends up producing the same environmental damage
than a CSR rm would have obtained ascribing to a prot maximizing objective, that is not taking into
account neither consumers nor the environment in its decisions. The best CSR motivation for the environ-
ment is the consumer-friendly CSR rm, which cares for not only its prots but also about all the consumer
surplus, as a proxy of its concern for its "stakeholders" or consumers. The second best motivation is the
consumer-environment friendly CSR-rm which cares about its prot, all consumer surplus and all environ-
mental damage. In terms of policy recommendations, this analysis is in line with behavioral environmental
economics, which encourages the understanding of the drives behind the economic agents actions (Carlsson
and Johansson-Stenman, 2012) and calls for discriminatory taxes depending on the motivations of the CSR
rms. A potential way to implement this policy would be through the use of reporting and certication of
CSR practices. This provides an avenue for future research on the subject.
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